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LAND USE CONTROLS
ROBERT M. RHODES*, MITCHELL B. HAIGLER** AND GENE D.
BROWN***
The authorst outline and analyze some of the more impor-
tant developments in land use law having an impact upon Florida
practice. The areas considered include: regulation by referen-
dum, impact fees, intergovernmental zoning, federal jurisdiction
of "navigable waters," and the wide-spread use of mandatory
platting.
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"Making the world safe for the environment is not the same thing
as making the environment safe for our world. "
* B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1964; J.D., 1968, M.P.A., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1973. Member of the Florida Bar and the law firm of Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer,
Turner & Rhodes. Chairman of the Environmental Law Section of the Florida Bar.
** B.A., University of Alabama, 1968; J.D., Florida State University, 1975. Member of
the Florida Bar and the law firm of Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer, Turner & Rhodes.
*** B.S., Florida State University, 1963; J.D., University of Florida, 1966. Member of
the Florida Bar and the law firm of Brown, McDonnell & Hart.
, Robert Rhodes and Mitchell Haigler authored the sections on referendum zoning,
impact fees, equitable estoppel, intergovernmental zoning, and regulatory jurisdiction. Gene
Brown authored the section on mandatory platting.
1. Krostol, The Environmentalist Crusade, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 12, col. 4, 6,
cited in M. Berger, To Regulate, or Not to Regulate - is that the Question? Reflections of the
Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 Loy.
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The past year has provided some significant opportunities for
the courts to clarify precedents by expanding or contracting tradi-
tional doctrines in the area of environmental law and land use. The
result has been a number of noteworthy decisions representing use-
ful contributions to the evolution of these areas. The authors will
examine the most important cases in detail and analyze their im-
pact.
I. LAND USE REGULATION BY REFERENDUM
A. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
The question before the United States Supreme Court in City
of EastLake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.2 was whether a city
charter provision requiring proposed land use changes to be ratified
by fifty-five percent of the voters violates the due process rights of
landowners applying for zoning changes.
The City of Eastlake, a suburb of Cleveland, adopted a com-
prehensive zoning plan which was codified in a municipal ordi-
nance. Forest City applied to the city planning commission for a
zoning change to permit construction of a multi-family, high-rise
apartment building. The planning commission recommended the
proposed change to the city council which, under Eastlake's proce-
dures, could have accepted or rejected the commission's recommen-
dation. In the meantime, the voters of Eastlake amended the city
charter to require that any changes in land use .agreed to by the
council must be approved by a fifty-five percent referendum vote.'
The city council approved the planning commission's recommenda-
tion for rezoning, and Forest City subsequently applied to the plan-
ning commission for "parking and yard" approval for the proposed
building. The commission rejected the application on the basis that
the council's rezoning action had not been submitted to the voters
for ratification.
Forest City then filed an action in state court to invalidate the
charter provision as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
L.A.L. REv. 253, 284 n.175 (1975).
2. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
3. Article VII, § 3, Charter of the City of Eastlake as amended November 2, 1971. The
Charter provision also required assessment of election costs against the affected property




power to the electorate. Pending lower court action, the city coun-
cil's action was submitted to referendum, and the proposed zoning
change was not approved by the requisite fifty-five percent vote.
Following the referendum, the lower court and the Ohio Court of
Appeals sustained the charter provision.
The Supreme Court of.Ohio reversed by concluding that enact-
ment of a rezoning provision is a legislative function. The court held
that the referendum requirement lacked sufficient standards to
guide the decision of the voters, hence, permitting police power to
be exercised in a standardless, arbitrary, and capricious manner.,
The Supreme Court of Ohio went further and held that the referen-
dum provision itself constituted an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive power.
In turn, Eastlake was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. Central to the Court's action was its recognition that the
Ohio court characterized Eastlake's rezoning action as legislative in
nature. Such characterization was reinforced by a provision of the
Ohio Constitution which specifically reserved the power of referen-
dum to municipal electors "on all questions which such municipal-
ity may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by
legislative action. . ... 5 Hence, to be subject to Ohio's referendum
procedure, the action must be within the scope of legislative power.
The Supreme Court accepted Ohio's classification of the rezon-
ing action as legislative. The court, however, rejected the proposi-
tion that the zoning referendum involved an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power.' Borrowing from THE FEDERALIST No. 39,
the Court noted the power of the electorate to establish legislative
bodies and to reserve to themselves authority to deal directly with
matters that otherwise might be assigned to the legislature.' Refer-
enda, as a means for direct political participation, therefore, allows
the people a veto power over enactments of representative bodies on
questions of public policy.'
4. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740
(1975).
5. OHIo CONST. art. 13, § 1 (f) (emphasis added).
6. "A referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of power. Under our
constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to repre-
sentative instruments which they create." 426 U.S. at 672 (1976).
7. Id. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
8. 426 U.S. at 678 (1976). The Ohio court concluded that the Eastlake procedure consti-
tuted a delegation of power violative of federal constitutional guarantees, since the voters
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The Supreme Court, however, did not leave Forest City remedi-
less. The Court stated that if the substantive result of the referen-
dum is arbitrary and capricious the action is open to challenge. The
remedy available would be determined as a matter of state law, as
well as under fourteenth amendment substantive due process stan-
dards.' In addition, the Supreme Court suggested that Forest City
and similarly situated referendum losers might seek relief from un-
necessary hardship through a variance request.10
Justice Stevens gave an incisive dissent bottomed on the propo-
sition that the "town meeting process of decision-making" obfus-
cates the real issues in the case, which are: first, whether the city's
rezoning procedure must comply with the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment; and second, if they must comply, whether
the city's procedure is fundamentally fair." Recognizing that depri-
vation caused by zoning customarily is qualified by affording a
property owner a right to apply for an amendment to accommodate
particular needs, the dissent concluded that such opportunity is an
aspect of property ownership protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Hence, the property owner has a right
to a fair procedure in the consideration of the merits of his applica-
tion.
The dissent attacked the majority's reliance on the Ohio court's
classification of rezoning as legislative as opposed to administrative
or quasi-judicial. 2 Prefering to characterize rezoning as
were given no standards to guide their decision. Hence, no mechanism existed nor could exist
to assure that voters would act rationally in passing upon a proposed rezoning. The court
stated that "appropriate legislative action may not be dependent upon the potentially arbi-
trary and unreasonable whims of the voting public." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324 N.E.2d at
746-49 (1975).
9. 426 U.S. at 677 (1976).
10. Id. at 679 n.13.
11. Id. at 680.
12. The dissent relied upon several state appellate decisions:
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited
review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary
abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permisible
use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usuallly an exercise of
judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.
Fasano v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973).
In addition, the Supreme Court of Washington has declared:
Zoning decisions may be either administrative or legislative depending upon the
nature of the act. But, whatever their nature or the importance of their categoriza-
tion for other purposes, zoning decisions which deal with an amendment of the
1086 [Vol. 31:1083
LAND USE CONTROLS
"administrative," Justice Stevens concluded that "[t]he insistence
on fair procedure in this area of the law falls squarely within the
purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."" Since procedural due process must apply to municipal re-
zoning referenda, Justice Stevens offered several reasons why East-
lake's procedure was an arbitrary and unreasonable method of ad-
dressing a local problem, including the intent of the city to obstruct
land use changes and specifically to burden those seeking multi-
family housing."
While recognizing that initiatives or referenda may be appro-
priate methods for deciding questions of community policy, Justice
Stevens declared that "the popular vote is not an acceptable
method of adjudicating the rights of individual litigants." 5 He
added that the city requirement of a mandatory referendum placed
a manifestly unreasonable obstacle in the path of every property
owner seeking a zoning change, did not provide standards or proce-
dures exempting particular parcels from the referendum require-
ment, and the case record contained no community justification for
the use of the referendum. Justice Stevens therefore concluded that
the Supreme Court of Ohio's appraisal of the fundamental unfair-
ness of the decision making process should be respected.' 6
B. Eastlake's Impact on Florida Law
Although the Florida Supreme Court has not confronted the
issue of voter approval of governmental land use decisions, two dis-
trict courts of appeal have addressed the constitutionality of
code or reclassification of land thereunder must be arrived at fairly. The process
by which they are made, subsequent to the adoption of a comprehensive plan and
a rezoning code, is basically adjudicatory.
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan
and zoning code it acts in a policymaking capacity. But in amending a zoning
code, or reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an adjudi-
cation between the right sought by the proponents and those claimed by the
opponents of the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are
readily identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may permeate
a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of
citizens than on the public generally.
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 295, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).See also Snyder
v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975).
13. 426 U.S. at 686 (1976).
14. Id. at 689, citing 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 324 N.E.2d at 748-49.
15. Id. at 693.
16. Id.
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Eastlake-type referenda and have issued differing opinions. In City
of Coral Gables v. Carmichael,7 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that action by the City of Coral Gables in amending
its comprehensive zoning ordinance by changing the zoning on par-
ticular property was legislative rather than quasi-judicial; there-
fore, it was subject to the referendum provisions of the city charter.
Quoting from its previous holding in City of Miami Beach v.
Schauer,'8 the Carmichael court cited Blankenship v. City of Rich-
mond'" for the proposition that: "It would be flagrantly inconsis-
tent to hold that the adoption of a comprehensive zoning law is
legislative in character and that the amendment to such was a
quasi-judicial act. If the original act is wholly legislative, an amend-
ment to it partakes the same character."2
The Third District further held that submitting the ordinance
to referendum would not deprive the opponents or proponents of
rezoning of due process or equal protection. The court cited a Su-
preme Court of California case"' for the proposition that: "The pro-
ponents and opponents are given all the privileges and rights to
express themselves in an open election that a democracy or republi-
can form of government can afford to its citizens upon any munici-
pal or public affairs."2
In 1976, the rationale of Carmichael was rejected by the District
Court of Appeal, First District, Andover Development Corp. v. City
of New Smyrna Beach.23 In Andover, the landowner applied for and
obtained rezoning of his property for Planned Unit Development
(PUD). Following the rezoning, Andover's predecessor in title ob-
tained final approval from the city of a master plan and contracted
with Andover to sell the property conditioned upon financing and
continuation of the PUD zoning. Andover culminated the sale and
then worked with the city officials to improve the originally ap-
proved plan. Prior to approval of the new plan a petition for referen-
dum was filed. The referendum would have repealed the zoning
ordinance applicable to Andover's property and adopted an ordi-
17. 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. discharged, 268 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
18. 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
19. 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948).
20. 256 So. 2d at 408, quoting Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. at 106, 49 S.E.2d
at 325.
21. Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927).
22. 256 So. 2d at 409, quoting Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. at 516, 253 P.2 at 936.
23. 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
[Vol. 31:1083
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nance severely restricting density of particular uses within the city.
Pending the referendum election, the city planning board approved
Andover's final development plan. As a result'of the referendum,
however, Andover's property reverted back to pre-PUD zoning, sub-
stantially restricted by density caps approved by the voters.
The First District determined: "Unquestionably the citizens of
the City of New Smyrna Beach utilized the process of initiative and
referendum to accomplish a rezoning of Andover's tract of land.
Such a procedure does not meet the elemental requisites of constitu-
tional due process." 4 The First District concluded that Carmichael
relied heavily upon California appellate decisions that had since
been rejected.25 The court concluded that the zoning ordinance initi-
ated by the citizens of New Smyrna Beach was enacted to overrule
the fact-finding function of the planning commission and the ad-
ministrative decision of the city commission." As to Andover's tract,
the purported action of the citizens through initiative and referen-
dum violated the basic requisites of constitutional due process and
therefore was void.
Eastlake seems to have deferred to the Supreme Court of Ohio's
classification of the power to rezone as legislative in order to form
the basis of its holding.2 As such, Eastlake must be read with the
perspective that the Supreme Court of Florida has yet to determine
whether rezoning is legislative or adjudicative in nature. If deter-
mined to be legislative, Eastlake would control. If adjudicative, the
24. Id. at 235.
25. The Court quoted extensively from Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d, 48,
107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973). In Taschner, the court emphatically rejected the proposition that
the election process provides equivalent safeguards afforded by state zoning law procedures:
The kind of public debate on the merits of a proposed zoning measure afforded
by the election process, including the limited opportunity for the submission of
written arguments to the voters, cannot be equated with a dispassionate study,
evaluation and report upon the proposal by a staff of planning experts (§ 65804),
notice and hearing before the planning commission (§ 65854), written recommen-
dation by the planning commission with reason for its recommendation (§ 65855),
and notice and hearing before the legislative body (§ 65856).
. ..Moreover the election offers the voters but a single choice, to accept or
reject the proposal in its entirety. The legislative body, however, is empowered
to modify (as well as approve or reject) a recommendation of the new planning
commission thereby enabling if to consider and take. into account in its actions
the legitimate claims and suggestons of those who would be affected by the pro-
posal even though they may represent but a samll segment of the electorate.
328 So. 2d at 236, quoting, Taschner, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
26. 328 So. 2d at 238-39.
27. See 426 U.S. at 674 n.9.
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edicts of Eastlake may be distinguishable.
Eastlake also left unresolved the question of procedural due
process. It would seem possible, therefore, for a gtate uprom court
to follow the majority opinion in Eastlake, but nevertheless find
that a particular referendum procedure violated requisite proce-
dural due process guarantees.
Although Eastlake reinforces the United States Supreme
Court's respect and encouragement for local government responsi-
bility, the decision reflects a remarkable insensitivity to land man-
agement and the land use decision making process. The case, more-
over, fails to afford property owners an impartial forum where land
use decisions can be made. In Eastlake, public and individual prop-
erty rights were ultimately considered and determined by popular
opinion. Notwithstanding positive recommendations by land use
professionals, plaintiffs were denied rezoning solely because they
were not able to garner the approval of fifty-five percent of those
voting in the referendum. Judicial endorsement of this process ig-
nores the substantial efforts made by state and local governments
to professionalize land management. Moreover, it sacrifices costly
intensive planning studies and individual property rights to popular
whim and parochial neighborhood prejudice. It certainly cannot be
contended that the town hall, letters to the editor, and public dem-
onstrations offer the same dispassionate, professional review of a
proposed land use change as a qualified planning commission vested
with delegated administrative authority. Under Eastlake, individ-
ual land use changes may be legislative; and as such, they necessar-
ily affect multiple interests and are not subject to stringent due
process procedural protection. They simply become additional is-
sues vying for attention in the public opinion marketplace. Unfor-
tunately, Eastlake, will discourage a healthy trend recognizing that
governmental decisions affecting particular parcels are administra-
tive or judicial in nature, since they have significant impact on
individual rights. In sum, instead of a hearing, argument, record,
specific findings, and application of legislative standards to a pro-
posed land use modification, affected, parties now can look forward
to a costly and possibly vituperative public opinion contest. Addi-
tionally, in communities implementing Eastlake, the hard land
management decisions can be expected to be passed on to the elec-
torate, with planning commissions and elected officials left with
little incentive other than to serve as intermediate conveyorbelts.
Greater infusion of political bias into land use decison is likely. This
1090 [Vol. 31:1083
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will be coupled with less recognition of expert counsel and their
work products.
Florida has enacted the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act of 1975.25 A major provision of this legislation requires
that zoning and all land development orders and regulations must
be consistent with a mandated comprehensive plan."9 The underly-
ing concept of the comprehensive plan is that all property within a
particular community is restricted to a certain degree, but is ulti-
mately benefitted from a rational development scheme reflected in
the community plan. Eastlake portends ill for the comprehensive
plan because land use decisions and the rationale of the plan are
undercut by a series of "spot" referenda. The more controvesial
portions of the plan will be susceptible to referenda, while more
mundane decisions will not be challenged. Hence, regulation by
referendum could effectively transform a comprehensive plan into
a crazyquilt reflection of neighborhood preferences.
As recognized in Florida Statutues section 23.014 (1975), prepa-
ration and review of the comprehensive plan is a continuing process
based upon evolving community needs and available data. Land use
regulations implementing a plan also must offer flexibility in order
to provide for orderly and balanced future development."0 Change
is seen as a necessary ingredient of a practical, comprehensive land
management program. Unfortunately, the costly, problematical
specter of an Eastlake referendum will discourage landowner appli-
cation for requisite change. The effect will be a static and unrespon-
sive planning and regulatory system.
Since land use regulations must be consistent with the compre-
hensive plan, a particular parcel may be subject to multiple refer-
enda if rezoning, phased PUD approval, and building permits are
28. FLA. STAT. § § 163.3161 -. 3211 (1975). See generally Ravikoff, Land Use Planning,
1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. -. (1977).
29. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1) (1975) provides:
After a comprehensive plan or element or portion thereof has been adopted in
conformity with this act, all development undertaken by, and all actions taken
in regard to development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to land
covered by such plan or element shall be consistent with such plan or element as
adopted. All land development regulations enacted or amended shall be consis-
tent with the adopted comprehensive plan or element or portion thereof.
30. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(1) (1975) provides: "The comprehensive plan shall consist of
materials in such descriptive form, written or graphic, as may be appropriate to the prescrip-
tion of principles, guidelines, and standards for the orderly and balanced future economic,
social, physical, environmental, and fiscal development of area."
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required. Hence, a landowner could win a referendum challenge to
a granted rezoning, only to be publicly rebuffed on approval of a
PUD phase. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are doctrines for-
eign to the legislative arena. The impact of such potential harrass-
ment on developers and financiers of large-scale projects is incalcu-
lable.
The Supreme Court's assurance that arbitrary and capricious
results of a referendum are subject to judicial rectification provides
little comfort to the property owner. In a situation where a proposed
rezoning is approved by the city council and then rejected by the
electorate in a referendum, it appears that a landowner would have
to prove that: (1) the pre-existing zoning classification is arbitrary
and unreasonable; or (2) that the electorate acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. Traditionally, an owner only had to show that rezoning
was desirable and beneficial to the community and generally was
consistent with an existing comprehensive plan. The post-Eastlake
burden imposed upon a referendum loser will be extremely difficult
to carry in view of the judicial deference granted not only to elec-
toral preference, but to legislative decisions which are presumed
valid and are generally upheld if "reasonably debatable." Moreover,
from a practical viewpoint, Eastland puts the local government in
an unenviable position if the landowner sues. Having first publicly
approved the proposed land use modification, the government, fol-
lowing popular rejection of the proposal, may then have to defend
a lawsuit brought by the property owner who previously had re-
quested and been granted the relief by the government.
In this same vein, the Supreme Court's suggestion that a devel-
oper who loses a referendum may seek a variance also appears to
provide little assistance. Although variances may be used to provide
specific relief to particular property unduly burdened by a zoning
classification, a number of courts have been hesitant to recognize
the variance as a means to secure a zoning change. As one author
has noted, "[a] variance is not to confer special privileges-that is,
it is only to relieve hardship, not to confer benefits that are not
enjoyed by neighboring property."'" This restriction is reflected in
Florida's County and Municipal Planning for Future Development
Act,32 which explicitly provides that variances are only authorized
31. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING 199 (1971).
32. FLA. STAT. ch. 163, pt. H (1975).
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for height, area, and size of yards, structures and open spaces. Vari-
ances may not be granted to permit an otherwise prohibited use.
3
Hence, a rezoning disguised as a variance is not acceptable in Flor-
ida, and relief through a variance should be unavailable once a
rezoning is rejected.
A final disturbing aspect of Eastlake is the stimulus the case
provides for local governments to ignore regional responsibilities
and to establish or retain exclusionary and no-growth policies. Mr.
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Stern of the Supreme Court of
Ohio when the latter noted: "There can be little doubt of the true
purpose of Eastlake's charter provision-it is to obstruct change in
land use, by rendering such change so burdensome as to be prohibi-
tive. The charter provision was apparently adopted specifically, to
prevent multi-family housing. . . -.1 Justice Stern recognized ref-
erendum procedure as "simply an attempt to render change difficult
and expensive under the quise of popular democracy." 5 The availa-
bility of referenda can be expected to provoke aditional individual
and neighborhood association challenges to growth-inducing land
use decisions. Parochial interests will coalesce and seek allies with
the promise that when the growth scourge hits other neighborhoods,
the united front 'will be maintained through the quid pro quo. In
sum, the referendum potentially may be employed to restrict
growth, defeat solutions to pressing urban and regional problems,
and to keep out minorities. Moreover, the sale price of housing
developments that do survive a referendum will include the cost of
the referendum campaign, thereby adding more stress to the fragile
low and moderate income housing market.
These effects are particularly devastating in Florida, which has
recently enacted several regional land and water management pro-
grams.3" For example, Florida Statutes, chapter 380 provides that
local government decisions having regional impact37 or within an
area of critical state concern 8 may be appealed to the Florida Land
33. FLA. STAT. § 163.170(8) (1975); cf. Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1957). But
see Clarke v. Morgan, 327 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1976).
34. 426 U.S. at 689, quoting 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199, 324 N.E.2d at 748.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. § § 373.012-.1962 (1975);
The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. § § 380.012
-.12 (1975).
37. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1975).
38. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1975).
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and Water Adjudicatory Commission, composed of the governor and
cabinet. 3' The legislation attempts to bring a regional or state-wide
perspective to bear on local government decisions having greater
than local impact. Unfortunately, following Eastlake, it would be
difficult to imagine the governor and the cabinet, statewide elected
officials, overturning even a blatantly exclusionary local govern-
ment denial of a development of regional impact, if such denial were
effected by a popular referendum.o Hence, at least in Florida,
Eastlake could potentially eviscerate the development of regional
impact review process, thereby transforming the DRI process into
just another no-growth, exclusionary, regulatory tool.
The Eastlake majority drew support from the FEDERALIST No.
39 in upholding land use regulation by popular referendum. Perhaps
the Court should have also considered THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
authored by Madison:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part
of society against the injustice of the other part ...
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or
until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms
of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of
nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger .... "
A similar opinion was shared by De Tocqueville:
If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event
may be attributed to the omnipotence of the majority, which may
at some future time urge the minorities to desperation, and oblige
them to have recourse to physical force. Anarchy will then be the
result, but it will have been brought about by despotism.2
A system of law, with concomitant procedures and unbiased review-
39. FLA. STAT. § 380.07 (1975).
40. Further questions are whether local action effectuating a decision of the Florida Land
and Water Adjudicatory Commission could be challenged by referendum or whether the
Commission could hear an appeal of a referendum decision affecting a development of re-
gional impact. The "ping-pong" potential of such a process is evident.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 323-24 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
42. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 121 (1956).
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ing bodies, serves to diffuse the will of an oppressive majority and
to secure justice for the individual pitted against the community.
Recognizing that major growth management decisions are often
unpopular, several states have recently introduced basic due process
guarantees into land management decisions. Eastlake, unfortun-
ately, will not only discourage further state efforts, it will encourage
land use regulation by "an omnipotent majority."
II. IMPACT FEES AND MANDATORY DEDICATION
The issue of impoged exaction of fees and dedications as condi-
tions to final development approval has been simmering in Florida
for a decade. In Contractors and Builders Association v. City of
Dunedin,43 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the validity of
impact fees and provided guidelines for setting such fees. At issue
was the portion of a water and sewer connection charge that would
be collected and earmarked for capital improvements to the entire
municipal water and sewer system. The Association contended that
these earmarked funds constituted taxes which a city is forbidden
to impose in the absence of specific enabling legislation. The city
responded that the fees were not taxes, but user charges analogous
to monies collected by privately owned utilities for services ren-
dered. The court recognized the connection charges as user fees.
However, the court invalidated the ordinance because it failed to
restrict municipal use of monies generated by the fees. In addition,
the court determined that the ordinance did not satisfy the Florida
Statutes section 180.13(2) (1975) requirement that municipal fees
must be "just and equitable" since the entire burden of financing
future capital expenditures for water and sewer needs was imposed
on persons connecting to the system after an arbitrarily chosen time.
The court encouraged Dunedin to adopt another sewer connection
charge ordinance, incorporating appropriate restrictions consistent
with its opinion.
The significance of Dunedin lies in the court's approval of the
impact fee concept. "Raising expansion capital by setting connec-
tion charges. . . which do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably
anticipated costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion is
reasonably required, if use of the money collected is limited to meet-
ing the cost of expansion. "" Hence, a local government may charge
43. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
44. Id. at 320 (emphasis in original).
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a connection fee in excess of the actual cost of the connection if:
1. the fee does not exceed a proportionate part of the amount
reasonably necessary to finance the expansion;
2. facility expansion is reasonably required based on antici-
pated growth patterns; and
3. use of collected fees is limited to meeting the costs of expan-
sion.45
The Dunedin court declared that: "[W]e see nothing wrong
with transferring to the new user of a municipally owned water or
sewer system a fair share of the costs new use of the system in-
volves."4 The Dunedin fee was to be collected prior to issuance of a
building permit and, therefore, must be characterized as a condi-
tional exaction.
The conceptual marriage of impact fees and mandatory dedica-
tions is readily apparent. Both share a common police power genesis
bottomed on the principle that he who generates growth must pay
his proportionate share of governmental costs required to service
such growth. In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,47 a chal-
lenge was initiated to Dade County's ordinance requiring dedication
of canal rights-of-way and maintenance easements as a condition of
subdivision plat approval."8 In upholding the Dade County scheme,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, discussed the two stan-
dards generally applied by the various state courts when reviewing
mandatory dedications. Both standards-the "reasonably related to
the needs of the community" test; 9 and the "specifically and
45. See Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), in
which the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, invalidated a Broward County impact
fee imposed on a per dwelling unit basis to fund road maintenance. Of particular concern to
the Fourth District was the possibility that collected fees might be used to benefit the public
generally, as opposed to fee payors, and the failure of the Broward County ordinance to
specify when the subsidized roads were to be built. See generally Rhodes, Impact Fees: The
Cost-Benefit Dilemma in Florida, 27 LAND UsE L. AND ZONING DIO. 7 (1975).
46. 329 So. 2d at 317-18.
47. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
48. Mgro. DADE Co., CODE § § 28-13(a)-(c) (1957).
49. See Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). Commenting on Ayres,
the Wald court opined:
While we believe that a legislative authority may require dedication of land as a
condition for subdivision plat approval, the constitutional validity of such re-
quirements should not be tested merely for reasonableness. Such a method of
review would allow local governments almost unlimited discretion in the imposi-
tion of dedication requirements. For this reason, we cannot accept the Ayres rule
of "reasonable relation."
338 So. 2d at 866.
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uniquely attributable" to the activity of the subdivider test 0-were
rejected by the court. The Third District determined that the
"reasonable relation" test places too heavy a burden on a developer
to show that the required dedication bears no relation to the general
health, safety and welfare."' The "specifically attributable" test, on
the other hand, imposed an undue burden on a municipality to show
that the mandated exaction is directly and solely attributable to the
proposed subdivision and based upon discerned community needs.
The court found that this burden undermines the presumption of
validity attaching to police power measures, and affords little defer-
ence to the judgment of the local legislative authority. 2
The Third District drew support from Eskind v. City of Vero
Beach,53 in developing its own standard of review. In Eskind, a case
involving regulation of outdoor advertising, the court held that pri-
vate business could not be subjected to police power restrictions
where there was "no reasonably identifiable rational relationship
between the demands of the public welfare and the restraint upon
private business. . . ,, 1 Although Eskind involved a business reg-
ulation, the Wald court appropriated its standard of review to deter-
mine the validity of subdivision exactions on the basis that a subdi-
vider is in essence a land processor, who attempts to maximize
profits in much the same manner as a businessman.55 Hence, a
subdivider is distinguishable from the ordinary property owner who
merely reserves his property for personal use or sale as a single
tract."6
The test developed by the Third District for mandatory dedica-
50. See Admiral Devi Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
Commenting on Admiral Dev. Corp., the Wald court declared:
While the Maitland case did cite a Rhode Island decision which utilized the
"specific and unique" language of Pioneer Trust, both of these cases are distin-
guishable to the extent that they were concerned with dedication requirements
which were set at fixed percentage by law. Such fixed percentage requirements
were found to be arbitrary on their face.
338 So. 2d at 867.
51. 338 So. 2d at 866.
52. Id. at 866-67.
53. 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963). See Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 076-199 (Sept. 24, 1976) regarding
the authority of a city to require dedication of land for park purposes as a condition precedent
to plat approval.
54. 159 So. 2d at 212.
55. 338 So. 2d at 867.
56. Id.
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tions, focused on whether there was "a reasonable connection be-
tween the required dedication and the anticipated needs of the com-
munity." 7 Referring to its test as "the rational nexus approach,"
the court declared that this approach provides a more feasible basis
for testing subdivision dedication by balancing the prospective com-
munity needs and individual property rights, and also by treating
the business of subdividing as a profit making enterprise."
Wald reflects the first Florida appellate recognition of the
"reasonably related to the needs of the community" test. Although
claiming that it rejected this broad standard of review, the Third
District apparently embraced this liberal test, as qualified by a
requisite finding of a "rational nexus" between community needs,
based on intelligent planning, and the dedication requirement. The
Wald test must therefore be placed beside the Fourth District's
recognition of the "specifically and uniquely attributable to the
developer's activity" test, thereby setting the stage for future su-
preme court resolution of disparate appellate standards of review for
local government mandatory dedication requirements. 9
IlI. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND VESTED RIGHTS"°
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is available in Florida to
prevent arbitrary action by governments exercising land use pow-
ers.' A property owner may invoke the doctrine when he:
(1) in good faith
(2) upon some act or omission of the governmment
(3) has made such a substantial change in position or has in-
curred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be
highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he acquired."
57. Id. at 868.
58. Id. Although individual property owners ordinarily may not have their property
appropriated without eminent domain proceedings, subdividers may be required to dedicate
land where the requirement is part of a valid regulatory scheme. Id.
59. Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). In City
of Boca Raton v. Talmon, No. 75-4286 (Fla. 15th Cir. 1976), appeal pending, Boca Raton's
ordinance requiring developers of subdivisions to obtain a letter of intent covering new school
construction from the Palm Beach County School Board was invalidated.
60. See generally Rhodes, These Rights are Mine: Downzoning, Vested Rights and Equi-
table Estoppel, 50 FLA. B.J. 586 (1976).
61. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1963).
62. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973),
rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976), citing Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d
433 (Fla. 1963). Although the Supreme Court of Florida partially reversed the Third District,
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In Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood,63 the Su-
preme Court of Florida reaffirmed the principle that equitable es-
toppel may be invoked against a municipality and applied the doc-
trine even though actual physical construction had not been under-
taken by the builder. The court held that since a property owner had
obtained a building permit from the city and, without actual or
constructive knowledge of an impending zoning change, spent al-
most $200,000 on the site plan, models, architect's plans and specifi-
cations, and building permits in reliance on a rezoning, the city was
equitably estopped from changing the zoning and the developer
possessed a vested right in continuation of existing zoning.
The import of Hollywood Beach Hotel, however, lies in the
supreme court's recognition that citizens may expect to be dealt
with fairly by the government with regard to land use decisions.
This means that when a property owner acts in good faith, thereby
triggering the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a government must
deal fairly with an applicant or assume responsibility for any ad-
verse results that stem from invoking equitable estoppel. In
Hollywood Beach Hotel, the supreme court determined that the
deliberate eleven month inaction by a city on a rezoning petition to
downzone appellant's property, coupled with appellant's reliance on
the city's extension of their building permit, the city's recission of
appellant's permit without prior notice and the subsequent man-
date that appellant proceed with construction within ninety days
amounted to "unfair dealing.""
In addition, the court applied the doctrine based on a finding
that the city failed to take action within a reasonable period of time
after it was apprised of proposed development activity. It is now the
law that government deferral, or omission to take action, following
notice of proposed development activity, can justify a finding of
vested rights: "While a city commission certainly possessed the pre-
rogative of deciding to defer action on [a rezoning request] over a
long period of time, it must assume the attendant responsibility for
the adverse effect it knows or should know its deliberate inaction
will have upon parties with whom it is dealing."65
it specifically approved this statement of the doctrine.
63. 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976).
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id.
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IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL ZONING DISPUTES
"[P]lunged into the vacuum of power" 6" by legislative silence,
the courts traditionally have exempted governmental units from
zoning. 7 The rationale for governmental immunity from zoning
stems from the notion that if governmental units were amenable to
zoning, the public well-being would suffer." It is assumed that pub-
lic construction and land use would be thwarted through applica-
tion of zoning measures to governmental units." While this is basi-
cally true, this assumption misses half the picture: The public well-
being likewise is served by zoning regulations. 0 Land use regula-
tions preserve the existing character of a geographical area, stabilize
land values, and provide a means for orderly development." The
issue of governmental amenability to zoning, therefore, presents a
question of competing public interests.
The issue of intergovernmental zoning was presented to the
Supreme Court of Florida in 1976 for the first time in a quarter of a
century. The precise issue before the court in Hillsborough Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace,72 was
whether a state agency is amenable to municipal zoning. The su-
preme court adopted the district court's decision and opinion,73 that
an agency is amenable.
A. Traditional Tests
Absent a legislative statement either subjecting or exempting
a governmental unit," various tests have been used to resolve inter-
governmental zoning disputes. The first test involves the distinction
between whether the intended use serves a governmental or a pro-
66. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 536
(1957).
67. See 2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. XXI (3d ed. 1965); Annot., 61
A.L.R.2d 970 (1958). See also Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Govern-
mental Land Use, 39 TEx. L. REv. 316, 317 (1961).
68. 2 J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 1280 (2d ed. 1955).
69. Id.
70. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 2.06 (1968).
71. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPH, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § § 1-11 (3d ed.
1956).
72. 332 So 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1976), noted in 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 191 (1976).
73. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d 571
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
74. 322 So. 2d at 578.
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prietary function." If governmental, the use is exempt from zoning;
if proprietary, the use must be consistent with the applicable zoning
regulation.7" Utilization of this test has led to inconsistent results
due to the absence of clear guidelines.77
The second approach, the "superior sovereign" test," focuses on
the status of the governmental land user and its relationship to the
zoning authority. Under this theory, a zoning authority may not
impose its regulations on a unit with a higher status in the govern-
mental hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy stands the federal
government with the state governments and their agencies below.
In Florida, the lowest position in the hierarchy theoretically is held
by the municipalities. Municipalities, however, derive their powers
directly from the Florida Constitution,79 which tends to place them
on the same level within the hierarchy as the counties and state
agencies, rendering the "superior sovereign" test inapplicable in
Florida.
A third approach for resolving intergovernmental zoning dis-
putes depends upon whether the unit has the power of eminent
domain.80 If so, it is exempt from zoning, even if the property was
acquired through purchase, since the test focuses on the existence
of eminent domain powers.8 ' Implicit in this test is the questionable
assumption that the power of eminent domain is superior to zoning
power.
75. See, e.g., Nichols Eng'r & Research Corp. v. State ex rel. Knight, 59 so. 2d 874 (Fla.
1952); cf. AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, 246 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971)
(amenability of a county to its own zoning restrictions).
76. AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, 246 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
See also 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 70, § 9.05.
77. Compare County of Westchester v. Village of Mamaroneck, 22 App. Div. 2d 143, 255
N.Y.S.2d 290 (1964), afid, 16 N.Y. 2d 940, 212 N.E.2d 442, 264 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1965) (sewage
disposal as governmental purpose), with Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256 Ala.
436, 441, 55 So. 2d 196, 200 (1951) (sewage disposal is proprietary for zoning purposes but
governmental for tort purposes). See generally Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objec-
tions to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REv. 910, 938 (1936), where the
author states: "no satisfactory basis for solving the problem whether the activity falls into
one class or other has been evolved. The rules sought to be established are as logical as those
governing French irregular verbs."
78. Note, Governental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HAav. L. Rxv. 869,
877 (1971); 31 U. MtAMi L. REv. 191 (1976).
79. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
81. See, e.g., Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974);
O'Conner v. City of Rockford, 3 Ill. App. 3d 548, 279 N.E.2d 356 (App. Ct. 1972); State ex
rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
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B. The Balancing of Competing Public Interests Test
The district court in Temple Terrace, with whom the Florida
Supreme Court later agreed, rejected all of the traditional tests.2
The district court concluded that the traditionally employed single-
factor tests simply do not provide sufficient flexibility to insure
protection of local interests."
Both the district and supreme courts agreed that greater coop-
eration between the zoning authority and the governmental land
user would occur if the government unit is presumptively bound by
the zoning regulation. 4 Under this approach the burden would lie
with the governmental unit seeking exemption from the zoning law
to demonstrate to zoning authorities that on balance the public
interest favors the intended use. 5 The appropriate method of seek-
ing permission to proceed with the development or use is by obtain-
ing a special exception, variance, or amendment in the zoning ordi-
nance, whichever is appropriate. 6
In administering the balance of competing interests approach,
zoning authorities will not have a "precise formula or set of criteria
82. 322 So. 2d at 378; 332 So. 2d at 612. It shoud be noted that while the recent supreme
court decision establishes statewide application of the balancing of competing public interests
test for resolving intergovernmental zoning disputes, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, adopted this approach in 1974. Palm Beach County v. Town of Palm Beach, 310 So.
2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975) (county held amenable to municipal zoning); Orange County v.
City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (municipalities bound by county zoning
regulations). There is conjecture that the Supreme Court of Florida utilized a balancing of
public interests test in State ex rel. Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930), holding
that Indian River county need not comply with an unreasonable and arbitrary Vero Beach
zoning ordinance. Nichols Eng'r & Research Corp. v. State ex rel. Knight, 59 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1952), casts serious doubt upon this contention since the court in the latter case suggested a
governmental-proprietary approach. It therefore seems more likely that the Helseth court was
applying the "unreasonable and arbitrary" test commonly associated with impermissible
land use controls on private property, which requires an extremely strong showing to invali-
date the regulation. See GOVERNOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT No.
1 TAKINGS, DUE PROCESS AND THE POLICE PowERS: AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO
LAND USE REULATIONS IN FLORIDA (Fla. 1975).
83. 322 So. 2d at 578-79.
84. Id. at 579; 332 So. 2d 610, 613.
85. 322 So. 2d at 579.
86. Id. See also Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
The district court in Temple Terrace suggested that in some instances a state agency may
be so convinced of the need for a particular land use that it would choose to go forward
without resort to local zoning authorities. 322 So. 2d at 579. While the supreme court did not
address this point, one commentator has addressed the need for summary procedures when
an emergency situation exists. Comment, The Inapplicability of Municipal Zoning Ordi-
nances to Governmental Land Uses, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 698, 713-714 (1968).
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which will determine every case mechanically and automatically,""7
but an initial consideration should always be whether there is statu-
tory guidance that resolves the issue. Absent an explicit statutory
directive all factors should be weighed. However, the following fac-
tors almost always will require consideration."8
First, the nature and scope of the governmental body seeking
to implement a nonconforming use should be examined. This factor
allows a determination of the governmental unit's position in the
hierarchy and the existence of eminent domain authority, though
neither of these factors alone should be controlling. Also of interest
would be whether the governmental user possesses statutory author-
ity to select the exact location of its facilities.
A second factor is the type of land use involved. The use of this
factor permits an examination of the collateral effects of the devel-
opment, such as noise and traffic congestion, and the effects upon
other public services. An illustrative case, 9 resolved under tradi-
tional analysis, concerned the constrution of a county jail near a
public school. This ingredient also prompts a consideration of the
proposed development's environmnnntal impact.
Also to be weighed is the public interest to be served by the
intended use. While this factor ineluctably leads to a determination
of whether the function is mandatory or permissive (governmental
or proprietary), the need for determining whether the development
is critical cannot be discounted. Statewide and regional interests,
as well as local interests, may be addressed. Of additional concern
is the current level of services being provided to the public.
Another key consideration would be the effect on the govern-
mental unit if denied permission for the development. The burden
of demonstrating the lack of alternative methods and locations
should rest with the governmental unit seeking permission for a
non-conforming use. The existence of suitable alternative locations
for the development strongly favors enforcement of the zoning
scheme. Conversely, if the zoning regulations make no provision
87. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d 571,
575 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), citing, Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153, 286 A.2d 697,
704 (1972).
88. Compare City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322
So. 2d 571, 576 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), with Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 151-54,
286 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1972).
89. State ex rel. Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 2d 4 (1930).
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whatsoever for the intended use, this should weigh in favor of grant-
ing the use.
A paramount concern under this balancing of interests test,
overlooked under traditional analysis, should be the interests of
adjacent and surrounding landowners. Since one purpose of zoning
is to stabilize property values, a severe impairment of adjacent
property values should militate against the intended use. Similarly,
if the intended use would drastically overburden public facilities
such as water, sewage, and transportation services in the area, the
balance may tip against permitting the use. An important consider-
ation would be whether the governmental unit has made or will
make, reasonable attempts to alleviate or minimize the harm to
adjoining landowners. Similarly the effect upon the local land use
scheme would be important with the relevant considerations vary-
ing with each locale.
The balancing of public interests requires review of a complex
mix of competing interests and no one factor should be overriding.
The critical point is that under this test, governmental units will not
be permitted to undertake a nonconforming use without obtaining
prior approval by zoning authorities or the courts if the former
proves unsuccessful.
C. Legislative Guidance
In Temple Terrace, the supreme court reiterated that the state
has the power to exempt itself from zoning ordinances, 0 and further
acknowledged that a non-conforming use may be legislatively di-
rected." This implies that a constitutional or express legislative
grant of authority to select a particular location, incident to eminent
domain power, would immunize a government unit from zoning
ordinances."
While it may be thought that the decision in Temple Terrace
would prompt efforts by government units to seek legislative exemp-
tion from zoning, the opposite may be true. Recent legislation seem-
ingly echoes the philosophy of the Temple Terrace decision and
directs that gevernment developments be consistent with local land
use schemes. The Local Government Comprehensive Act of 197511
90. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610,
613 n.5 (Fla. 1976).
91. Id. at 613.
92. Id. at 612 n.2.
93. FLA. STAT. § § 163.3161-.3211 (1975).
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requires that not later than July 1, 1979, each county and munici-
pality in the state adopt a comprehensive land use plan. Elements
of the mandated comprehensive plan include a future land use plan
designating future distribution, location, and extent of land uses for
public buildings and facilities and for public services and facilities.
Section 163.3161(5) of the Act provides:
It is the intent of this act that adopted comprehensive plans shall
have the legal status set out in this act and that no public or
private development shall be permitted except in conformity
with comprehensive plans, or elements or portions thereof, pre-
pared and adopted in conformity with this act."
Furthering this intent, section 163.3194(1), provides that after a
comprehensive plan or element thereof has been adopted in con-
formity with the Act, "[a]ll development undertaken by, and all
actions taken in regard to development orders by, governmental
agencies in regard to land covered by such plan or element shall be
consistent with such plan or element as adopted."95 The term
,"governmental agency" is given an all-encompassing definition in
the Act." In sum, the local Government Comprehensive Planning
Act of 1975 provides clear legislative guidance that governmental
agencies shall be amenable to zoning regulations adopted pursuant
to the Act.
Thus, the issue concerning governmental amenability to land
use regulations was resolved consistently by both the Supreme
Court of Florida and the state Legislature. Hopefully the result will
be increased cooperation between governmental land developers
and zoning' authorities in achieving the benefits of effective com-
munity planning.
V. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY JURISDICTION
A. Federal Jurisdiction: The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 18997
During the survey period, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit construed the extent of the jurisdictional grant
of the Army Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Ap-
94. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(5) (1975) (emphasis added).
95. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(l) (1975).
96. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(8) (1975).
97. See generally 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. -_(1977), for another discussion of these cases.
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
propriation Act of 1899.98 In United States v. Sexton Cove Estates,
Inc.:" Weigumann v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers;' and United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.,"" the
court was faced with two basic issues: (1) the Corps' jurisdiction
over activity shoreward of the mean high tide line (MHTL), 10 and
(2) the authority of district courts to enforce violations by way of
restoration orders.
03
1. MEAN HIGH TIDE LINE AS A JURISDICTIONAL LIMIT
The extent of the Corps' power stems from section 403 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act which makes it unlawful to
(1) create an obstruction to the navigable capacity of any of
the waters of the United States;
(2) build any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater,
bulkhead, jetty or other structures in any port, haven, harbor, canal,
navigable river or other water of the United States outside of estab-
lished harbor lines or where no harbor lines have been established;
or
(3) excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the
course, location, condition, or capacity of any port, haven, harbor,
canal, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States,
without approval from the Army Corps of Engineers.
Nowhere in the Act is there any reference to the topographic
location of activities that may cause a prohibited obstruction to
navigable waters. Prompted by the silence in the Act and the actual
prior practice of the Corps,'"' the defendants in all three cases
argued that activities conducted above MHTL are not within the
Corps' jurisdiction. It should be noted that location of MHTL is, in
fact, the litmus paper test for determining both the limit of admi-
ralty jurisdiction over tidal waters'05 and the boundary of tidal water
for property law purposes. 06 The petitioners had a further basis for
98. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
99. 526 F.2d 1293 (5h Cir. 1976).
100. 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976).
101. 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
102. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
104. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir. 1976).
105. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); United States v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1297 (5th Cir. 1976).
106. Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); United States v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1297 (5th Cir. 1976).
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their argument in dictum from an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion con-
cerning Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.'"7 In Moretti I, the court seemed to
say that MHTL was the jurisdictional limit of the Corps. In United
States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.,' 5 the court negated Sexton
Cove's argument that Moretti I was dispositive. The court pointed
out that the unlawful activities under scrutiny in that case had
occurred below MHTL.1°9 Furthermore, the Corps' policy of regulat-
ing only seaward of the MHTL was not determinative since that
jurisdictional limitation was self-imposed."10
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the mere location or source of
the operation is not wholly determinative of section 403 jurisdiction.
The court concluded that the section's prohibitions are not assigned
to a particular locale;
[Section 403] prohibits any obstruction to navigable capacity.
There is no suggestion that an obstruction whose source is above
MHTL escapes prosecution . . . . It prohibits the alteration or
modification of the course, condition, location or capacity of a
navigable. water. There is not the slightest intimation that an
alternation or modification whose source is above MHTL is any
less an alteration or modification. There is nothing in the lan-
guage of the statute nor the logic of its implementation which
creates this barrier beyond which the Corps is ubiquitously pow-
erless. Indeed, such a limitation would thwart the design of the
statute. We concluded, then, that activities which occur shore-
ward of MHTL, absent Corps approval, may, within certain limi-
tations, be within the prohibitions of the Act."'
The court was aided in its broad reading of the act by United States
v. Republic Steel Corp.,"' where the United States Supreme Court
expressly rejected a restrictive reading.
The test established by Sexton Cove focuses upon the effect on
navigable waters, a factor the court found at least as significant as
location. After reviewing the dredging operations involved,," the
107. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
108. 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976), noted in 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. -(1977).
109. 526 F. 2d at 1298.
110. Id. See also Hayer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Butressing a
Citadel Under Siege, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 19, 25 (1973).
111. 526 F.2d at 1298-99 (footnotes omitted).
112. 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960).
113. Sexton Cove was involved in dredging ten canals, five canals connected with waters
which are clearly navigable, while the remaining canals were "landlocked." 526 F.2d at 1295.
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court determined that Sexton Cove's action with respect to the five
canals connecting directly to navigable waters was within the Corps'
jurisdiction since those waters "affected" navigable waters. This
was due to the alteration of the shoreline and the use of the canal
as an access to navigable waters."'
Using similar reasoning, the court held that the five "plugged"
canals were not within the jurisdictional grasp of the Corps."16 As to
these canals, the "ebb and flow of the tide" test, utilized in deter-
mining navigability, was held not to be controlling in the context
of section 403 jurisdiction. "If it [were], every hole dug in south
Florida would be within the Corps' jurisdiction . . .,,"
Weiszmann"7 involved the dredging of two canals-one
"connecting" and one "landlocked." Based on Sexton Cove, the
court reached an identical split decision. It also should be noted that
liability in Weiszmann alternatively was founded upon a violation
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act."8 "Dredged spoil" fits
within the term "pollutant""' and the penalties can be quite severe.
"The FWPCA provides for penalties of up to $10,000 per day of each
violation .... ."I1" Much of the significance of United States v.
Joseph G. Moretti2' lies in its concise explanation of the holding in
Sexton Cove:
[Tihe Corps may under certain circumstances exercise jurisdic-
tion over dredging and filling operations above MHTL under Sec-
tion 403 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Prerequisite for such
jurisdiction are factual circumstances showing some effect upon
navigable waters, some alteration or modification of either
course, location, condition or capacity of those waters.22
Perhaps this trilogy's most significant development is that the
Corps' new attitude may forewarn further jurisdictional revision. At
the same time, the Fifth Circuit's disavowance of its dictum in
114. Id. at 1298-99.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.
1976).
118. 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. V 1975).
120. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302, 1304 (5th
Cir. 1976).
121. 526 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 1309.
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Moretti I, that no jurisdiction lay over dredge and fill operations
shoreward of the MHTL, may foretell a judicial disposition toward
recognizing an even larger sphere of Corps jurisdiction.
2. RESTORATION ORDERS
The Sexton Cove Estates trilogy, as noted at the outet, also sets
valuable precedent concerning restoration orders as relief for viola-
tions under section 403 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The propriety
of such orders was before the Fifth Circuit in all three instances but
what was lacking was "a factual record establishing that the court's
choice of the specific restoration ordered was based upon a compre-
hensive evaluation of the environmental factors involved and the
practicalities of the situation.' 2 3 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, va-
cated the restoration orders in all three cases pertaining to activities
conducted within the Corps' jurisdiction.'24 While specific relief was
in issue, the general authority of district courts to direct restoration
under section 406 of the Rivers and Harbors Act 25 was not seriously
at issue since that authority had been upheld in Moretti I.
In Sexton Cove, the court explained the need for a hearing on
the issue of restoration: "The full effects of any environmental dis-
turbance are difficult to measure. Attempts to reverse such effects
and restore the environment to its natural state carry with them no
guarantee of success."' 20 Since successful environmental rehabilita-
tion is uncertain, the landowners should be permitted adequate
opportunity to present their evidence and contentions regarding res-
toration. '27
The factors which district courts should consider in fashioning
restoration orders are: (1) the nature and extent of the environmen-
tal disturbance; (2) the feasibility and likelihood of successful envi-
ronmental restoration; (3) the maximum obtainable environmental
benefits; and (4) equitable considerations that may temper the ap-
propriate relief.'28 While preserving the district court's authority to
formulate an order conferring the maximum environmental bene-
fits, the court's decision seemingly would prevent restoration orders
123. Id. at 1504.
124. 526 F.2d at 1301, 1307, 1311.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
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Sexton Cove Estates,. Inc. v. State Pollution Control Board",
involved the propriety of the Board's denial of the landowner-
petititoner's application for an after-the-fact certification that exca-
vation of its upland canals would not violate the water quality stan-
dards of connected navigable waters. The Board's refusal to grant
the certification was accompanied by its determination that peti-
tioner also was in violation of another law-section 403.087(1),13"
which prohibits the operation, maintenance, construction, or modi-
fication of a stationary installation 3' that reasonably would be ex-
pected to be a source of water pollution. The standards established
by section 403.087(1), however, became effective after petitioner's
application had been filed. The First District Court of Appeal re-
manded with directions to grant or reject certification on the basis
of standards in existence at the time the application was filed. 3'
Pretermitting any issue as to the propriety of the new stan-
dards, the court explained why an application should be measured
by standards existing at the time of application. "It is well known
that many installations, such as those dredged by the petitioner,
which have been completed down through the years in the develop-
ment of waterfront land in Florida would not meet the standards
now in existence.
33
While petitioner acted at its own peril in not obtaining a permit
prior to dredging, the peril did not include imposition of standards
adopted subsequent to filing an application. The dissent argued
that respondent honestly could not grant the requested certifica-
tion, that no standards had been developed at the date of applica-
tion and that the issue was potentially moot in view of pending
federal proceedings."'
129. 325 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
130. FLA. STAT. § 403.087(1) (1975).
131. FLA. STAT. § 403.031(8) (1975).
132. 325 So. 2d at 470.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 470-71.
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2. ARTIFICALLY CREATED NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
The extent of jurisdiction conferred by chapter 253 of the Flor-
ida Statutes over artificially created navigable waterways again was
an issue before the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in 1976.
In State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund v. Sea-Air Estates, Inc.,'35 the Third District had to
decide whether a landowner who desired to dredge solely within
artificially created waters must obtain a dredging permit pursuant
to section 253.123(1) of the Florida Statutes.'36 The case arose when
the Board sought an order requiring Sea-Air Estates to replace the
materials it had dredged from artificially created canals. By coun-
terclaim, the landowner sought a declaratory judgment on the same
issue.
In Jefferson National Bank v. Metropolitan Dade County, "I the
court previously had held that a landowner seeking to fill beyond a
duly established bulkline would be subject to the requirements of
section 253.124.138 The court in Jefferson National Bank recognized
no jurisdictional distinction under that section between natural and
artificially created navigable waterways. 3 ' The Board, relying on
Jefferson National Bank, argued that no distinction should be made
with regard to permit requirements for dredging in natural and
artificially created navigable waterways. The court disagreed, how-
ever, holding Jefferson National Bank distinguishable since that
case involved filling in state-owned navigable waters. Such fillings
fall within permit requirements of another section which does not
expressly exempt artifically created navigable waters from its
ambit. Section 253.123, on the other hand, expressly provides that
"nothing herein shall relate to artifically created navigable wa-
ters."14 0
3. WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO GRANT A PERMIT
In Askew v. Gables-By-the-Sea, Inc.,"I the District Court of
Appeal, First District, reviewed a final judgment granting the
135. 327 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
136. FLA. STAT. § 253.123(1) (1975).
137. 271 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
138. FLA. STAT. § 253.124 (1975).
139. 271 So. 2d at 213.
140. FLA. STAT. § 253.123 (1975).
141. 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
landowner a mandatory injunction compelling condemnation of its
land by the state. The appellate court affirmed and adopted the
trial court's final judgement.
Earlier proceedings in the litigation resulted in a determination
that the owner of bottom lands purchased from the state had been
wrongfully deprived of the right to fill the submerged lands. The
state's revocation of a fill permit also had caused the landowner
further damage through the loss of a federal permit for the intended
operations.
The trial court, in fashioning a "make whole" remedy had ruled
that the landowner was entitled to a state dredge and fill permit for
a period equivalent to the time remaining under the previously re-
voked permit. Thereafter, the landowner sought the necessary per-
mits to undertake the filling opertions. Meanwhile, an application
for a new federal permit was denied. According to the court, a con-
tributing cause of the denial was the negative evaluation by several
state agencies charged with ecological responsibilities, including
agencies not parties to the litigation.
The court held that the landowner was entitled to a mandatory
injunction requiring institution of condemnation proceedings.
"[T]he state cannot 'after selling submerged land to private own-
ers deny such owners the right to use those lands in the only way in
which private ownership can be of any value.'" '
While the decision may be viewed merely as an inverse condem-
nation action, perhaps more interesting is the court's consideration
of the actions of non-party state agencies as contributing factors in
the denial of the federal permit. Implicit in the court's analysis is
the recognition that an action against a single state agency may
effectively bind all state agencies.
VI. MANDATORY PLATING AND THE RIGHT TO SELL
The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act
of 1972111 divided all Florida counties into two basic types:
"regulated" and "unregulated.""' A regulated county is one which
has adopted a zoning ordinance or subdivision regulation, and an
unregulated jurisdiction is one which has adopted neither.1" This
142. Id. at 61.
143. FLA. STAT. § § 380.012 -.12 (1975).
144. See FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975).
145. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1975).
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distinction becomes critical under the Act [chapter 380] because
a "development of regional impact" (DRI)'48 is not subject to the
burdensome DRI process if (1) the development is in an unregulated
county which does not adopt zoning or subdivision regulations
within a ninety day period following the developer's notice to the
state land planning agency and local government agency with juris-
diction to adopt zoning regulations; and (2) the area is not declared
an "area of critical state concern" within the same ninety day pe-
riod. 4 '
. Following the passage of chapter 380, many Florida counties
enacted zoning and subdivision regulations, either to gain control
and jurisdiction over a specific, pending development or in an over-
all effort to bring the county within the provisions of chapter 380.
While some of these counties undoubtedly acted on their own voli-
tion, many others were prompted into action by the regional plan-
ning agencies'49 for the various districts. These agencies were estab-
lished to review pending developments of regional impact and gen-
erally to assist and advise local governments regarding planning and
development problems. The various regional planning agencies have
assumed many specific duties,'5 ° including the promulgation and
promotion of "boiler-plate" subdivision regulations for counties
146. A "development of regional impact" is "any development which, because of its
character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect upon the health, safety,
or welfare of citizens of more than one county." FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1975).
147. The designation "area of critical state concern" may be found only in the case of:
(a) An area containing or having a significant impact upon environmental, his-
torical, natural, or archeological resources of regional or statewide importance.
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, an
existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public invest-
ment.
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which may include a pro-
posed site of a new community, designated in a state land deyelopment plan. FLA.
STAT. § § 380.05(2)(a)-(c) (1975).
148. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(5)(c) (1975).
149. A "regional planning agency" is "the agency designated by the state land planning
agency to exercise responsibilities under [Chapter 380] in a particular region of the state."
FLA. STAT. § 380.031(13) (1975).
150. As to "areas of critical state concern," the agencies act in an advisory capacity to
the state land planning agency and recommend areas that meet the criteria for "critical
concern." FLA. STAT. § 380.05(3) (1975). The regional agencies also recommend to the state
land planning agency the types of developments for designation as "developments of regional
impact." In making the recommendations, the regional planning agency solicits suggestions
from local governments within its jurisdiction. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(3) (1975).
The agencies also have the responsibility for preparing reports determining the status of
proposed developments in its region. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1975).
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which want to become "regulated" under chapter 380. Although
there are variations among the various types of subdivison regula-
tions, all basically set forth detailed procedures and requirements
which must be met before a person may plat and sell his land.'5 '
Due partially to the ready assistance and zeal of the staffs of
the regional planning agencies, forty-five of the sixty-seven counties
had become "regulated" by the end of 1976. Of these, three counties
enacted subdivision regulations during 1976, and seven other coun-
ties had zoning or subdivision regulations under active considera-
tion at the end of the year, probably to be acted upon during 1977.152
Some of these subdivison regulations totally prohibit the sale of any
lot of less than five acres until and unless the land has been formally
platted.'53
151. The plat also is subject to the requirements of FLA. STAT. ch. 177, pt. 1 (1975).
152. The author obtained this information from the Division of State Planning and the
Office of the Secretary of State, State of Forida.
153. Typical of such requirements is the following language taken from the "boiler-
plate" edition of a set of subdivision regulations promulgated and promoted by the Northwest
Florida Planning and Advisory Council for use by counties in Northwest Florida:
Subdivision shall mean the division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two or
more lots, plats, sites, or other divisions of land, any one of which is less than five
acres except when the division results from inheritance or deed of gift. The term
includes resubdivision and when appropriate to the context, relates to the process
of subdividing or to the land or territory subdivided.
Sale or Transfer of Platted Land. No selling or transferring of land before approval
and recording. It is unlawful for anyone being the owner or agent of the owner of
any land to transfer, sell, agree to sell, or negotiate to sell such land by reference
to, or exhibition of, or by any other use of a plat of subdivision of such land
without having submitted a plat of such subdivision to the Planning Commission,
obtained the Commission's approval as required by those regulations, and re-
corded such approved subdivision plat as required. If such unlawful use be made
of a plat before it is properly approved and recorded, the owner or agent of the
owner of such land shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punish-
able as provided by law.
Selling of Land in Violation. Any contract to sell land in violation of this Article
shall be voidable at the option of the purchaser and the purchaser may recover
from such owner or agent of the owner any damages he may have suffered by
reason of the violation of any of these regulations. Suit for such damages may be
tried in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Enforcement and Penalties. No person or his agent shall subdivide any land
before securing the Planning Commission's approval of a plat designating the
areas to be sold or transferred.
All three of the subdivision ordinances enacted in 1976 contain similar restrictions against
the sale of land without reference to a properly recorded plat Lake County, Fla., Ordinance
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The primary problem with a mandatory platting requirement
is that it constitutes an unreasonable and unconstitutional restraint
on the right to alienate property. Since the statute of Quia Emp-
tores 54 gave each freeman the right to dispose of his property at his
own pleasure, the right to freely alienate one's property has been
recognized as an integral part of the right to own property. If a
person cannot freely dispose of his land, he has been deprived of a
large part of the value of such land.
The leading Florida case in this area is Kass v. Lewin. "I In
Kass, the supreme court considered the validity of the platting stat-
ute, 56 and held that: "the imposition of the burden of preparing and
recording a plat on the owner of land as a condition precedent to
his conveying same is an unreasonable and unconstitutional re-
1976-2 (Jan. 28, 1976); Flagler County, Fla., Ordinance 1976-1 (Feb. 18, 1976); Suwannee
County, Fla., Ordinance 76-01 (June 4, 1976)
154. 18 Edw. I., c. 1. (1290).
155. 104 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1958).
156. Chapter 25519, Laws of Fla. 1949, as amended by Chapter 30202, Laws of Fla. 1955.
In pertinent part, this statute provided as follows:
Section 2. Whenever the verb 'to plat,' in whatever tense used, is employed in
this Act, the same shall mean to divide or subdivide land into lots, blocks, parcels,
tracts or other protions thereof, however the same may be designated.
Section 3. Whenever land comprising one acre or more is platted into lots,
blocks, parcels, tracts or other portions, however designated, so as to comprise
three or more such to the acre, a plat thereof shall be recorded in the Public
Records of the county wherein such land lies.
Section 5. No lands shall be conveyed, leased or mortgaged nor shall any agree-
ment be entered into providing for the conveyance, leasing or mortgaging thereof
by reference solely to a plat thereof, unless such plat shall have been approved
and recorded as provided by law.
Section 6. No conveyance, lease or mortgage or agreement to convey, lease or
mortgage lands in violation of the provisions of this Act shall be recorded in the
public records.
Section 20. Any and all such conveyances, leases or mortgages, or agreements
to convey, lease or mortgage, or attempts to convey, lease or mortgage lands in
violation of the provisions of this Act, made or attempted to be made hereafter,
shall be void ab initio.
Section 21. Any sale of or offer to sell or contract to sell any lot, block, parcel,
tract or other portion of land, however designated, within the purview of this Act,
unless the provisions of this Act shall first have been complied with, shall consti-
tute a misdeameanor, and the person, firm or corporation found quilty thereof
shall be punished as provided by law. Each separate sale, offer to sell and contract
to sell shall constitute a separate offense.
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straint on the right to alienate property."' 57 In so holding, the court
quoted with approval the following language from one of its prior
decisions:
It is not necessary that a plat or a map of a person's property
showing lots and blocks be recorded before it can be sold. It may
be more convenient to sell by lots and blocks as was shown by a
recorded plat, but he may sell it by the inch, the foot, or the yard,
and describe it by metes and bounds.' 8
The court further held that the provision under consideration placed
"an unreasonable restraint on the right of alienation of property.
The word 'property' in the fourteen amendment to the United
States Constitution includes the right to acquire, use and dispose
of it for lawful purposes, and the constitution protects each of these
essentials."' 59
In Prescott v. Charlotte County, ,'0 the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, considered the validity of an ordinance which pro-
hibited the issuance of a permit for erection of a sign advertising the
land for sale until the landowner had secured final approval of a plat
of the property from the Charlotte County Board of County Com-
missioners. The trial court held the regulation valid because there
was no requirement that the land be platted before it could be sold
or offered for sale.' In affirming, the Second District drew a clear
distinction between the ordinance before it and the ordinance in-
volved in Kass. The court pointed out that. the .only problem with
the ordinance in Kass was that it required platting as condition
precedent to the sale of property. Because the Charlotte County
case did not contain such a restraint on alienation, the Second
District held the ordinance constitutional.
In light of these cases, it is remakable that the various regional
planning agencies would continue to recommend the enactment of
subdivision regulations which require platting as a condition prece-
dant to sale. It is even more remarkable that-so many counties, and
their attorneys, approve and sanction such ordinances. Under Kass,
which is still the law of Florida, it is clear that ordinances such as
157. 104 So. 2d at 577.
158. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360, 365 (Fla. 1952).
159. 104 So. 2d at 578, citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
160. 263 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).




the one promulgated by the Northwest Florida Regional Planning
and Advisory Council, 1 2 as set forth above, could not withstand a
constitutional attack. Under that ordinance, there is no way a land-
owner can sell or offer to sell any tract of land of less than five acres
without first going through a costly and time consuming platting
approval process. For example, if a person owned ten thousand acres
and simply wanted to sell four acres, he would still have to file a
formal plat. In view of the many technical requirements of the ordi-
nance, as well as those found in the Florida Plat Law,"' the cost to
an individual landowner to sell one lot could be several thousand
dollars. This restraint on alienation clearly appears to be unconsti-
tutional under existing Florida law.
The state planning agency and the various regional planning
agencies should make an effort to revise the subdivision regulations
currently being promulgated to remove the above-referenced man-
datory platting requirements. In so doing, the planning staffs should
distinguish between the landowner who is actually making a
"material change in the use or appearance of '"" his land, and the
landowner who is simply conveying property by metes and bounds
descriptions without the dedication of any roads or easements, and
without reference to any plat. Sufficient safeguards in the area of
subdivision control law exist to prevent large scale misrepresen-
tation including the failure to provide promised improvements.' It
is unnecessary to include every conveyance when the primary pur-
pose is to assure the orderly planning and development of normal,
residential subdivisions. If such changes are not made, either by the
planning agencies or the counties, the time soon will come when the
mandatory platting requirements are declared invalid as an unrea-
162. See note 153,. supra.
163. If the county ordinance requires platting, the landowner is then subject to the
additonal platting requirements of FLA. STAT. ch. 177, pt. 1 (1975).
164. This is part of the definition of "development" in FLA. STAT. § 380.04(1) (1975).
165. Many safeguards are found in the Florida Uniform Land Sales Practices Law. FLA.
STAT. § § 478.011-.33(1975).
For example, it must be shown that the lands meet or will meet the requirements set by
local governing bodies with regard to public roads and streets, drainage, electric utilities, etc.
FLA. STAT. § 478.121(d) (1975). Teeth are added to the various requirements since willful
violation of any provision of chapter 478 results in commission of a felony of the third degree.
FLA. STAT. § 478.211 (1975).
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sonable and unconstitutional restraint on the right of alienation.' 86
166. While reconsidering the mandatory platting ordinances discussed in this article, the
state planning agency should also consider the validity of FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 22F-2.10(2)(a),
which defines "residential development" as "the subdivision of any land attributable to
common ownership into lots, parcels, units or interests . ..." The administrative rule is
apparently invalid in that it exceeds the statutory definition of "development" in FLA. STAT.
§ 380.04 (1975), which requires "the dividing of land into three or more parcels" and "the
making of any material change in the use or appearance of" the land.
